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We examine the impact of foreign underwriting activity on bond markets using issue-
level data in the Japanese “Samurai” and euro-yen bond markets. Firms choosing 
Japanese underwriters  tend to be Japanese, riskier, and smaller. We find that Japanese 
underwriting fees, while higher overall on average, are actually lower after conditioning 
for issuer characteristics. Moreover, firms tend to sort properly in their choice of 
underwriter, in the sense that a switch in underwriter nationality would be predicted to 
result in an increase in underwriting fees. Finally, we conduct a matching exercise to 
examine the 1995 liberalization of foreign access to the “Samurai” bond market, using 
yen-denominated issues in the euro-yen market as a control. Foreign entry led to a 
statistically and economically significant decrease in underwriting fees in the Samurai 
bond market, as spreads fell by an average of 23 basis points.  Overall, our results suggest 
that the market for underwriting services is partially segmented by nationality, as issuers 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 1996, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto announced a “big bang” set of 
reforms aimed at preventing further deterioration of Japanese financial markets and 
retaining Tokyo’s place as a leading world financial center. One important component of 
the “big bang” reforms concerned opening Japanese securities markets to foreign 
participants.   Various restrictions that had limited the activities of foreign issuers and 
underwriters were repealed during the 1990s, with restrictions on foreign participation in 
underwriting in the Samurai market being removed in mid-1995. While the pace of 
reform certainly accelerated subsequent to the 1996 announcement, the “big bang” 
deregulations are better perceived as the culmination of a long process of reforms that 
began long before the 1990s, but accelerated during that turbulent period [Hoshi and 
Kashyap (2001)]. 
The lifting of restrictions on foreign competition in Japanese securities markets 
was controversial. Japanese securities markets had already been liberalized in 1993, with 
the entry of Japanese commercial banks into underwriting services [Yasuda (2007)]. 
Underwriting activity was an important source of profitability for Japanese commercial 
banks experiencing pressure from bad loans associated with the collapse of the asset 
bubble at the start of the decade.  
Japanese investment banks were also under pressure, partly due to the entry by 
commercial banks into underwriting activity earlier in the decade, but also because of the 
poor overall performance of the Japanese economy. These pressures culminated in the 
failures of Yamaichi and Dai-Ichi Securities in October of 1997. The poor conditions 
faced by Japanese investment banks, combined with the relatively rapid success of   2
foreign underwriters in achieving substantial market share in Japanese securities markets, 
have led some to question whether Japanese securities markets will suffer from the so-
called “Wimbledon effect,” a term sometimes applied to the London securities market, 
where robust domestic financial activity is primarily underwritten by foreign investment 
banks [e.g. Pohl (2002)].  
This paper examines the impact of foreign entry into Japanese underwriting 
activity subsequent to the “big bang” liberalizations of the 1990s, using data on yen-
denominated bonds in the Japanese Samurai and euro-yen markets.
1 We first examine the 
characteristics of issues underwritten by domestic (Japanese) and foreign (non-Japanese) 
or mixed underwriters and the implications of issuer choice for underwriting fees in these 
three markets from 1996-2001, the period over which foreign underwriters had access to 
these markets. We use a two-step procedure, acknowledging the fact that the choice of 
domestic versus foreign underwriter is likely to reflect firm characteristics. We then 
examine the implications of using a foreign underwriter after conditioning for the factors 
leading to the issuing firm’s underwriter choice. Surprisingly, despite the fact that fees 
charged by Japanese underwriters are larger on average, we find that in most cases 
underwriting fees were increasing in the choice of a foreign underwriter at statistically 
and economically significant levels after conditioning for issuer characteristics.   
We then allow the firms that chose foreign or Japanese underwriters to differ 
more markedly, using the endogenous switching regressions technique employed by Fang 
(2005) and Song (2007). Using this methodology, we find that the question of whether 
foreign or Japanese underwriters are “cheaper” is poorly-posed. Instead, we find that 
                                                 
1 The domestic and euro-yen markets include issues by both Japanese and foreign firms. The Samurai 
market is a yen-denominated securities market located in Japan that specializes in issues by foreign firms.   3
firms that chose to issue with Japanese underwriters would be predicted to face higher 
fees on average by switching to foreign underwriters.  The same could also be said for 
firms issuing with foreign underwriters. In other words, Japanese and foreign 
underwriters in these markets appear to specialize in servicing specific bond issues in 
which they enjoy a comparative advantage.
2  
To further investigate the impact of foreign entry into these markets, we turn in 
the final part of the paper to the liberalization of the Samurai securities market in 1995 
that allowed foreign firms to participate in underwriting activities in this market. [Packer 
and Reynolds (1997)]  This deregulation of the Samurai market provides a natural 
experiment to investigate the impact of allowing access to foreign underwriters. Of 
course, the Japanese experience of the latter half of the 1990s was anything but tranquil, 
and other events that could affect the terms of bond issues were also taking place. To 
control for this, we conduct a matching test of the impact of opening up the Samurai 
market, using the terms faced by foreign issuers in the euro-yen market as a control. In 
contrast to the Samurai market, foreign underwriters had been underwriting yen-
denominated bonds in the euro-yen market since the beginning of the decade. As the 
Samurai market is limited to foreign issuers as well, our experiment matches foreign 
issuers in yen-denominated debt in the Samurai market to similar foreign issuers of bonds 
in the euro-yen market to gauge the implications of the policy change. Our results suggest 
that opening up the Samurai market to foreign underwriters resulted in a statistically and 
economically significant reduction in underwriting fees. These results are shown to be 
                                                 
2   Note that Carey and Nini (2007) found similar differences between borrower and lender activities by 
nationality in the syndicated loan market for the U.S. and Europe.   4
robust to a variety of matching techniques, including variants of Mahalanobis and 
propensity scoring matching. 
The remainder of this paper is divided into seven sections. Section 2 reviews the 
literature concerning underwriter choice and the determination of underwriter fees. 
Section 3 discusses our data set. Section 4 examines the determinants of choosing a 
domestic or foreign underwriter using various regression techniques. Section 5 examines 
the implications of underwriter choices on fees. Section 6 conducts our difference-in-
differences test concerning the liberalization of the Samurai bond market. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. Previous Literature  
2.1.  Underwriter Choice and its Implications 
  There is a large literature on underwriter reputation and outcomes in equity initial 
public offerings (IPOs). Carter and Manaster (1990) introduced a model of underwriting 
services with heterogeneous “prestige” levels for underwriters, measured empirically by 
revealed hierarchy in the “tombstone announcements” for IPOs. They find that low risk 
firms choose more prestigious underwriters to reveal their relative safety and avoid 
underpricing. James (1992) develops a model where underwriters invest in costly 
information-gathering activities that assist in subsequent underwritings. This implies that 
underwriters should charge lower spreads to firms that make subsequent issues. These 
predictions are confirmed in empirical tests of equity IPOs in the United States. Fernando 
et al. (2005) modeled underwriter choice as a two-sided matching activity. Their model   5
predicts that superior underwriters will service more borrowers, but that the market share 
of less able underwriters will increase as the overall size of the market increases.  
For bond underwriting in the U.S., Fang (2005) argued that underwriting firms 
will specialize among their clientele according to their reputation levels. In particular, 
higher reputation underwriters are predicted to specialize in underwriting higher-quality 
firms and charge higher fees than underwriters with lesser reputations. She finds that 
more reputable underwriters in the U.S. domestic bond market obtained lower bond 
yields for and charged higher fees to their bond-issuing clients, but the issuer received 
higher net proceeds overall.  She concluded that underwriter reputation generates rents 
and thus incentives for underwriters to remain reputable. 
  Another question addressed in the literature is the effect of banking relationships 
on underwriter choice, and the implications for financial liberalization resulting in entry 
into underwriting. Kroszner and Rajan (1994) find that banking relationships did not lead 
to poor decisions in securities underwriting in the United States prior to the imposition of 
the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933.  Following commercial bank entry into bond 
underwriting in 1989 in the U.S., Yasuda (2005) finds that bank relationships have a 
positive impact on underwriter choice. Yasuda (2007) finds similar results for the 
deregulation of the Japanese domestic bond market in 1993 that permitted commercial 
banks to underwrite corporate bonds.   
Overall, however, the bulk of the evidence suggests that liberalization does have a 
pro-competitive impact, as in Gande, et al (1999) and Kim, et al (2008), who find that 
commercial bank entry into underwriting services in the U.S. reduced underwriter 
spreads.   6
 
 
2.2. Liberalization of the Japanese bond markets 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance began liberalizing its bond markets during the 
1980s. For example, as noted by Nishi and Vergus (2007), foreign firms were first 
permitted to underwrite euro-yen bonds in 1984.  The most far-reaching deregulatory step 
was the 1992 Financial Institution Reform Act that effectively dismantled the separations 
between the sectors of the financial industry; i.e., commercial banks, investment banks 
and insurance firms.  For more detailed descriptions, see Hoshi and Kashyap (1999), de 
Jong et al. (2005), and Yasuda (2007).  
The 1992 Act also liberalized access by foreign firms to all three yen-
denominated bond markets, although there was not an immediate increase in foreign 
underwriting activity.  In fact, the first Samurai bond underwritten by a foreign firm was 
issued in 1995.  As noted in Packer and Reynolds (1997) and Packer (2000), foreign 
underwriting in the Samurai market was initiated mainly by a 1995 trade agreement 
between the Japan and the United States; see U.S. Treasury Department (1995). 
  There is evidence that previous liberalizations in Japanese securities reduced 
borrowing costs in these markets. McKenzie and Takaoka (2003) found that the 1993 
relaxation of the “three bureaus agreement,” which had favored the use of Japanese 
underwriters by firms in the euro-yen bond market, in 1993 (and abolished in 1998) was 
associated with a reduction in spreads paid in this market.  McKenzie and Takaoka   7
(2006) found that the 1993 relaxation of restrictions on underwriting activity by Japanese 




  The dataset we use to examine the yen-denominated bond market consists of 
8,459 individual bond issues: 7,854 in the euro-yen market and 605 in the Samurai bond 
market from 1992 through 2001.  The data was obtained from the Capital Data Bondware 
and Loanware data set from Dealogic. Summary statistics for these bond issues in each 
market are shown in Table 1. We divide the sample into two time periods, before and 
after 1996.  Note that our switching regression analysis presented in Sections 4 and 5 
below only includes the post-1996 portion of our data set, as the first stage regression on 
underwriter choice would contain no observations with foreign underwriters prior to 1996 
in the Samurai market.
4  
  Our first variable of interest is JSHARE, which represents the share of Japanese 
underwriters in the issue as a measure of the degree of domestic participation. This 
variable ranges from zero to one, with an interior value resulting when an issue has both 
                                                 
3   See Lopez and Spiegel (2009) for a discussion of foreign financial intermediation in Japan during the 
1990s. There are related studies concerning the impact of foreign competition on the banking sector. 
Claessens and Glaessner (1998) find that costs of financial services in eight Asian economies were a 
decreasing function of those countries’ financial openness. Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000) document 
credit supply shocks to Japanese banks operating in the United States as a result of shocks to the parent 
bank. Goldberg (2006) finds that U.S. bank to loans to Europe are pro-cyclical.   
 
4   Foreign underwriters were legally excluded from that market prior to that date.  We do, however, have 
observations with both foreign and domestic underwriters in the euro-yen market for the earlier period.  
****Consequently, we provide least squares estimation of the first-stage regressions for the entire sample 
period for this market in the appendix??? (Table A.1). 
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foreign and domestic lead managers.
5  Table 1 shows that average values of  JSHARE 
decreased markedly in both markets over the period from 1996 to 2001.  The share of 
issues with exclusive participation by Japanese underwriters fell from 82% to 72% in the 
euro-yen market, and from 100% to 78% in the Samurai market. 
LTOTVAL represents the log of total issue value converted from nominal yen 
value to current nominal dollar values.  It can be seen that the average total value of the 
issues in the Samurai market are largest, and that both markets exhibit a modest decline 
in average issue size over time.  INVGRADE represents the percent of issues rated as 
“investment grade.” The average share of investment grade issues is highest in the euro-
yen market after 1996, with 96.6% of issues at investment grade, while the post-1996 
Samurai market only has 81.8% of issues at investment grade. Note that the share of 
investment grade issues increased in both markets over time.  
UNSEASONED is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is issuing in our 
sample for the first time in either market. The share of unseasoned issues is lowest for the 
euro-yen market after 1996, with only 4.1 percent of unseasoned issuers.   
UNDREP, our measure of underwriter reputation, is an indicator variable equal to 
one if the underwriter is among the top ten in that market in that year in terms of total 
value of issues underwritten. The average share of top underwriters then measures the 
share of issues in the market underwritten by firms in the market’s top ten, which is an 
indicator of underwriter concentration.  Using this measure underwriting activity in the 
                                                 
5   Since we do not have data on shares of underwriting fees, we assume that underwriters have the same 
share of influence over a bond issue; i.e., the share of Japanese underwriters is set at 0.5 when there are two 
underwriters and one is Japanese. 
   9
Samurai market is more concentrated on average after 1996, with a 90% share, while the 
top ten underwriters in the euro-yen market only account for a 74% share. 
Similarly, our measure of overall underwriter reputation, OVERUNDREP, is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the underwriter of an individual issue is among the top 
ten underwriters across both the euro-yen and Samurai bond markets. Our summary 
measure in Table 1 is the average of this variable. Concentration is highest in the Samurai 
market after 1994 at 94 percent, but the euro-yen market is not much lower at a 90 
percent share. 
Turning to bond characteristics, years-to-maturity of a bond issue tends to be 
higher in the euro-yen market, averaging 6.8 years before 1996, and growing to 10.2 
years after 1996. In contrast, average years to maturity shrank in the Samurai market over 
the same periods, from 6.5 years to 5.4 years.  Note that LYRSMAT or the log of years-to-
maturity of the issue is used in the regression analysis.  COLLATERAL is an indicator 
variable for bond issues with explicit collateral requirements.  Both the euro-yen and the 
Samurai market had very few collateralized issues prior to 1996, less than 1%. However, 
in the latter portion of our sample, the share of collateralized issues in the euro-yen 
market rose to 4.6% while the share in the Samurai market remained below 1%. 
  We next turn to underwriting fees and yields.  FEE is measured as the amount 
paid to the underwriter divided by the total value of the issue. It can be seen that fees 
charged in the Samurai market are substantially higher than those charged in the euro-yen 
market both before and after 1996.  In the first subperiod, fees in the Samurai market 
were about 60% above those in the euro-yen market (0.82% versus 0.53%).  However, in  10
the latter subperiod, fees on Samurai issues rose, on average, to 0.95%, while euro-yen 
fees fell to 0.35%. 
  Table 2 presents average values for Japanese and foreign or mixed underwriters. 
We test the statistical significance of these differences with a simple means test.  It can be 
seen that issues with foreign underwriters tend to be larger, more likely to be investment 
grade, have shorter maturities, and are more likely to be collateralized.  Unseasoned 
issuers are more likely to use foreign underwriters.  Since Japanese underwriters are 
predominant among the leaders in these markets, issues with Japanese underwriters are 
more likely to be issues with top underwriters, both in the market of issue and overall. 
Finally, as has been documented elsewhere, issues underwritten by Japanese underwriters 
have substantially higher fees and spreads.  
 
4. Determinants of underwriter fees: IV specification 
  In this section, we examine the determinants of underwriter fees. We conduct an 
instrumental variables estimation to address the likely endogeneity of the choice of 
JSHARE, the share of Japanese participation in underwriting services.  Since foreign 
underwriters were barred from the Samurai market prior to 1996, our sample runs from 
1996 through 2001.
6  As our instrument, we use the nationality of the issuer.  As we 
found in the previous section, Japanese issuers are far more likely to use Japanese 
underwriters than foreign issuers. We then exclude the nationality of issuer from the 
specification of the fee equation.  This approach implies that after accounting for 
                                                 
6 We include year fixed effects in all specifications. Coefficient estimates on these are suppressed for space, 
but are available on request.  11
differences in firm characteristics, the only impact of being a Japanese firm on 
underwriter fees is through its impact on the choice of underwriter.  
Our first-stage results for the regression of JSHARE are reported in Table 3.  
Looking at the first specification, our measure of firm creditworthiness, INVGRADE, is 
negative and statistically significant at a 5% confidence level, indicating that more 
creditworthy firms are more likely to issue with foreign underwriter participation. The 
coefficient estimates also indicate economic significance.  Our point estimate indicates 
that the probability of issuing with foreign underwriter participation increases by 6.1% 
for investment grade issues.  We also obtain a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient for the total value of issues, LTOTVAL, suggesting that larger issues tend to 
favor the use of foreign underwriters.  
  As expected, we obtain a positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate 
for JAPANISSUER, an indicator variable for Japanese domestic firms.  The coefficient is 
again substantial as well, indicating that Japanese issuers are 6% more likely, on average, 
to issue with a Japanese underwriter than non-Japanese firms.  We would expect that 
unseasoned issuers would be more likely to choose foreign underwriters, as they would 
be less locked into existing relationships with Japanese firms.  However, the point 
estimate for our UNSEASONED variable is not statistically significant, although negative 
and suggestive that unseasoned issuers are less likely to use foreign underwriters. 
  The probability of Japanese underwriter participation is also increasing in the log 
of years to maturity, LYRSMAT. The coefficient estimate also indicates economic 
significance. A one-standard deviation increase in the log of years to maturity in the full  12
sample, which corresponds to a one-year increase, is expected to result in an 11% 
increase in the share of Japanese participation.  COLLATERAL is insignificant.  
 Our  UNDREP variable enters positively and significantly, with a point estimate 
that suggests that firms that issue with higher reputation underwriters also are 30.3% 
more likely to choose to issue with Japanese underwriters.  Finally, our indicator variable 
for issuance in the Samurai market enters with a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient. The point estimate suggests that the share of issues with foreign participation 
is 22% lower in the Samurai market than in the euro-yen market.  
  Model 2 includes the OVERUNDREP variable to the Model 1 specification. The 
results for the previously-included variables are similar, while the OVERUNDREP 
variable enters significantly positive with a coefficient point estimate that suggests 
issuers using underwriters with high overall reputations are 30% more likely to issue with 
Japanese underwriters. Note that the point estimate for the UNDREP variable decreases 
markedly when the OVERUNDREP variable is included. This result is not surprising, 
since these variables are relatively collinear, but the positive coefficient on the UNDREP 
is robust to the inclusion of the other variable. 
  Models 3 and 4 introduce the YIELD variable, which measures average nominal 
yields to maturity, into Models 1 and 2 respectively.
7  This variable enters positively and 
significantly in both specifications, indicating that firms that issue paper needing to offer 
higher yields tend to issue with Japanese underwriters. It can be seen that the coefficients 
on the prior variables are robust to the introduction of the YIELD variable, with the 
exception of the collateral variable that becomes positive and significant in contrast to the 
                                                 
7 YIELD can also be interpreted as an additional indicator of the riskiness of the issue, but our primary 
motivation for its inclusion was to avoid invoking an additional exclusion restriction for this variable as it is 
introduced in the second stage in Models 3 and 4 below.   13
results in Table 2.  In particular, the INVGRADE variable, which may be an alternative 
indicator of underlying asset quality, continues to enter negatively at statistically 
significant levels.  
  Overall, our first-stage results suggest that Japanese underwriters are favored by 
firms that are riskier, seasoned and Japanese, and those whose issues are smaller and 
collateralized. Issuers that are larger, safer and non-Japanese tend to be more likely to 
choose foreign underwriters in yen-denominated markets.  
We next turn to our second stage results concerning the determinants of 
underwriting fees, adding the instrumented JSHARE as an explanatory variable. As in the 
previous table, Models 1 and 3 run our specification with only UNDREP included, while 
Models 2 and 4 include both UNDREP and OVERUNDREP.  Moreover, as the cost of 
issuing debt is also a function of the interest rate paid on debt service, we add the variable 
YIELD, to our specification in Models 3 and 4 as a check of the robustness of our results. 
However, we also continue to report our results without this variable, as its inclusion 
reduces our sample size from 3,540 to 2,462 observations. 
  Our results are shown in Table 4. Our primary variable of interest is JSHARE, the 
share of Japanese underwriter participation. It can be seen that this variable enters 
negatively at statistically significant levels in all of our specifications, indicating that 
underwriter fees are decreasing in the share of Japanese underwriters after instrumenting 
for the nationality of the underwriter and conditioning for other issue characteristics.  The 
coefficient point estimates do decrease markedly in absolute value when the YIELD 
variable is included in Models 3 and 4, from approximately -4 to -0.75.  This result is 
surprising because it is commonly thought that foreign underwriters competed with  14
entrenched Japanese firms on price. Indeed, our summary statistics showed that Japanese 
underwriters were, on average, more expensive than their foreign competitors. These 
results suggest that the additional fees levied by Japanese underwriters are more than 
explained by the characteristics of issues that they service. 
  Among the other conditioning variables, INVGRADE enters insignificantly 
throughout, suggesting that asset safety is not priced directly in fees in these markets. We 
do find that fees are decreasing in LTOTVAL, suggesting economies of scale in the 
provision of underwriting services. However, this variable becomes insignificant after 
conditioning for average yields to maturity. LYRSMAT similarly enters positively, but 
becomes insignificant after conditioning for yields to maturity. COLLATERAL is 
insignificant throughout.  Finally, the SAMURAI variable is both positive and significant, 
validating the contention that fees are higher in the Samurai market. 
  Concerning underwriter reputation, both UNDREP and OVERUNDREP enter 
positively at statistically significant levels, as underwriters with superior reputations can 
charge higher fees to their issuers. This result may be due to their superior ability to place 
debt at desirable terms, holding all else equal. Our measure of issuer reputation, 
UNSEASONED, is insignificant throughout, but enters with a negative point estimate, 
suggesting that new issuers are able to issue at lower fees. Of course, this does not mean 
that they are better off, as the increased fees may represent the underwriter’s share of the 
rents associated with a long-term underwriter relationship. Despite these fees, positive 
rents from this relationship may also accrue to the issuer. 
 The  YIELD variable enters positively and significantly at a 1% confidence level in 
Models 3 and 4. This is somewhat surprising, because underwriters would be expected to  15
be able to charge higher fees when they achieve yield reductions. It may be the case that 
YIELD proxies for issue difficulty, as issues with higher risks and probabilities of default 
may require more diligence and pose a greater threat to the reputation of the underwriter. 
  After instrumenting for the endogeneity of the issuer nationality decision and 
other issue characteristics, our primary result is that fees were significantly lower for 
Japanese underwriters, suggesting that the higher fees charged by Japanese underwriters 
during this period were more than explained by differences in issuer characteristics.  
 
5. Endogenous switching regression results 
5.1. Methodology 
While the analysis above conditions for the influence of the choice of issuer 
nationality, it constrains the coefficient estimates for the determinants of fees by the other 
conditioning variables in our specification to be identical across underwriter nationality. 
This would be problematic if the determinants of underwriting fees differed 
systematically between Japanese and foreign underwriters. In this section, we allow our 
second stage coefficient estimates to differ across underwriter nationalities using the 
endogenous switching regression approach taken by Fang (2005) and Song (2007).   
Specifically, we treat the underwriter nationality decision as a binary outcome  i I , 
which reflects the share of foreign underwriter participation. The continuous form of this 
variable,   ranges between zero and one, with one reflecting only participation by 
foreign underwriters, and zero reflecting only Japanese underwriter participation.   is 
specified to be a function of a set of explanatory variables that satisfies 
 






where the latent underwriter decision is a function of a set of explanatory variables  i z  and 
an independent and identically distributed error term  i ε . We set the discrete realizations 
to 1 i I =  for issues that have any foreign underwriter participation, i.e. if   and 
0 i I =  for issues that have all Japanese underwriter participation, i.e. if 
* 0 i I ≤ . 
  Our second estimation stage specifies two equations for the determination of bond 
underwriting fees, one for the foreign underwriters and one for the Japanese underwriters.  
That is,  ' fii f f i yx u β =+  and  ' jii jj i yx u β = + , where  fi y  and  ji y  are the dependent 
variables of interest for bond issues underwritten by foreign and Japanese underwriters, 
respectively.  The unobserved (or missing) variables related to underwriter choice are 
accounted for in this regression by introducing the appropriate Mills-ratio terms 
generated from our first stage estimation. 
 
5.2. Results 
  Our results are reported in Table 5. The first column represents the first stage 
regression. Because we separate the samples for the second stage, underwriter nationality 
is treated as discrete, so that the choice is modeled as between using only Japanese 
underwriters or having any foreign underwriter participation. It is still the case that the 
majority of our issues choose only Japanese underwriters.    
  Overall, our first stage results are quite similar to those that we reported in our IV 
regressions. As expected, we obtain a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
estimate for JAPANISSUER, which equals one if the issuing firm is Japanese and zero 
otherwise.  We obtain a negative and significant coefficient for the INVGRADE variable, 
* 0 i I > 17
suggesting that Japanese underwriters were less likely to be chosen for these borrowers 
yen-dominated bond issues. 
  Turning to issue characteristics, it can be seen that YIELD enters positively and 
highly significantly.  We obtain a negative and statistically significant coefficient for the 
total value of issues, LTOTVAL, suggesting that smaller issues tend to favor the use of 
domestic Japanese underwriters.  We find that the probability of Japanese underwriter 
participation is also increasing in the log of years to maturity, LYRSMAT.  We find that 
bonds backed by COLLATERAL are more likely to issue under Japanese underwriters, 
but the relatively high standard errors on our estimate imply that it is only significant at a 
10% confidence level. 
  The performances of the remaining variables are all quite similar to the first stage 
of our IV specification. UNDREP again enters highly positively and significant. The 
point estimate for our UNSEASONED variable is again positive, but highly insignificant. 
Finally, our indicator variable for the SAMURAI market is again positive and statistically 
significant. The point estimate indicates that issues in the Samurai market are 61% more 
likely to use Japanese underwriters.  
  We next turn to our second stage results for the determinants of underwriter fees, 
which separate issues with purely Japanese underwriters from those with foreign 
underwriter participation. Here we see wide discrepancies, both with our previous IV 
results, in which these samples were pooled, and across the two sub-samples.  
  As in our IV specification, YIELD enters positively and significantly in both sub-
samples. We would again interpret this result as an increase in YIELD as reflecting a 
bond that is riskier and harder to place, therefore yielding higher fees.   18
As before, we obtain positive coefficient estimates on INVGRADE, although only 
the Japanese underwriter sub-sample is statistically significant. There may therefore be 
some evidence of increased fees for riskier placements in the Japanese sub-sample, but 
we do not find these in the sub-sample of issues with foreign underwriter participation. 
The sub-sample of issues with Japanese underwriters also obtains a surprising 
positive and significant coefficient for LTOTVAL. We had obtained a negative, but 
insignificant coefficient estimate in our pooled IV specification above. The positive 
coefficient suggests that there are fewer economies of scale in issuing with Japanese 
underwriters than we found in our IV specification for the overall sample. In contrast, we 
obtain a negative but insignificant coefficient for LTOTVAL in the sub-sample with 
foreign underwriter participation. 
We obtain a statistically significant negative coefficient on LYRSMAT for both 
sub-samples, suggesting that conditional on underwriter nationality it is actually cheaper 
to place longer-term issues.  We also obtain a negative coefficient on COLLATERAL for 
both sub-samples, again in contrast to the coefficient estimate we obtained for the pooled 
sample in our IV specification. The estimate is statistically significant at a 5% confidence 
level for the sub-sample with only Japanese underwriter participation and at a 10% 
confidence level for the sub-sample with some foreign participation.  After conditioning 
for underwriter nationality we find, as expected, that collateralized issues are easier to 
place, and therefore enjoy access to reduced underwriting fees. 
Concerning the remaining variables, UNDREP enters positively as before, and as 
expected, although only at statistically significant levels for the foreign underwriter sub-
sample. The SAMURAI variable enters positively for both sub-samples, as in the pooled- 19
IV specification, although the coefficient enters with an insignificant point estimate for 
the sub-sample of issues with foreign underwriter participation.  
Finally, the constant term estimates provides a measure of average “unexplained” 
fees in the euro-yen and Samurai markets. As before, we find that after conditioning for 
issuer characteristics the Japanese underwriters charged lower fees than their foreign 
counterparts at statistically significant levels.   
Our switching regression results differ from our previous pooled-IV specification 
in a number of dimensions: We obtain a positive coefficient on issue size among firms 
that issued solely under a Japanese underwriter, as well as negative and statistically 
significant coefficient estimates on the COLLATERAL variable in both sub-samples.  
In addition, a number of our pooled IV results fail to hold with significance for 
both sub-samples. For example, the coefficient on SAMURAI is insignificant for the sub-
sample of issues with foreign underwriter participation. This likely reflects the fact that 
firms that choose to use foreign underwriters have more discretion in their choice of 
markets, so that they would not choose to issue in the Samurai market if doing so resulted 
in an increase in fees. Similarly, LYRSMAT becomes significantly negative in both sub-
samples, suggesting that longer-maturity issues, which are likely to extend from safer 
firms, are more easily placed and hence subject to lower fees.  
However, the most surprising new result we find is that fees are increasing in 
issue size among firms that issued solely under Japanese underwriters.  This is not the 
case for firms issuing with foreign underwriter participation. Foreign underwriters appear 
to have brought in a number of large global firms desiring to issue yen-denominated 
paper. Among these firms, one might expect to see some economies of scale, as the fixed  20
cost of underwriting could be spread across a larger issue. However, such scale 
economies do not appear to be present among firms issuing with Japanese underwriters. 
These firms appear to face a premium in increased fees for larger placements, perhaps 
because increased issue size among firms using Japanese underwriters was associated 
with increased default risk during our sample period. 
 
5.3. Counterfactual Exercise   
  As highlighted in Fang (2005) and Song (2007), the endogenous switching 
regression allows us to generate counterfactual values for our dependent variable.  That 
is, based on the model’s estimated parameters, we can infer the fees that the client of a 
foreign underwriter might have faced if they had used a domestic underwriter.  This 
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where  ji y  is the fee faced by borrower i  who had used a foreign underwriter (i.e.,  1 i I = ) 
from domestic underwriter  j ,  i x  is the borrower’s vector of explanatory variables,  j β  is 
the corresponding parameter vector estimated for Japanese underwriters, and the last term 
is an adjustment based on the appropriate Mills ratio from the selection equation for 
foreign underwriters. The expected counterfactual value for a borrower that used a 







'c o v ,
1'
fi i fi i
fi i i
i











⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ == ≤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ =+ ≤ ⎣⎦
⎡ ⎤
=+ ⎢ ⎥
−Φ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
 (3) 
 
  This feature of the modeling framework allows us to examine the differences 
between the counterfactual and actual values of the dependent variable of interest.  In 
notation, the price improvement term for a borrower using a Japanese underwriter is 
expressed as  0 jij i i j i dE y I y ⎡⎤ == − ⎣⎦ , and the term for a borrower using a foreign 
underwriter is  1 fif i i f i dE y I y ⎡⎤ == − ⎣⎦ .  In our analysis, we examine the average values of 
these differences to determine whether and how these price improvement terms are 
statistically significant.  We examine these averages over the full sample of issues broken 
out by the type of underwriter actually used.  We extend the analysis by subdividing these 
groups by issuer nationality, seasoned borrowers and underwriter reputation. 
  Table 6 presents the results of our counterfactual analysis for the Samurai and 
euro-yen markets. We compare the fees paid with those that our model suggests would 
have been attainable by switching from a foreign underwriter to a Japanese one, or vice 
versa.   The first row shows the actual fees paid by firms in our sample that chose foreign 
underwriters and the hypothetical fees that our model predicts they would have paid if 
they issued with Japanese underwriters. Our results indicate that firms issuing under 
foreign underwriters paid an average of 50.9 basis points in fees (i.e., the ratio of gross 
fees on a bond underwriting to total issuance amount), while they would have paid an 
average of 63.6 basis points had they chosen Japanese underwriters, achieving a 
statistically significant savings of 12.7 basis points.  We also find that firms choosing  22
Japanese underwriters saved on fees relative to the fees that they would have faced from 
foreign underwriters. The estimated savings on fees by these firms was again substantial, 
18.5 basis points, again significant at a 1% confidence level.   
  To examine these aggregate results further, we subdivided the full sample in three 
ways: by issuer nationality, by underwriter reputation, and by seasoned borrowers.  In all 
cases, borrowers appear to have made the “correct” choice, in that they would have faced 
higher underwriting fees by issuing under the alternative group of underwriters. 
Moreover, in all cases but one, the discrepancy is statistically significant at a 1% 
confidence level. The lone exception is the group of seasoned issuers that issue under 
Japanese underwriters. We obtain a positive, but insignificant estimate of the savings in 
fees enjoyed by this group relative to what they would have been predicted to face had 
they issued with foreign underwriters of a paltry 1.4 basis points. This suggests that 
Japanese underwriters did not price their services aggressively in efforts to attract new 
clients, which are well-represented by our sample of unseasoned borrowers. This may in 
part explain their declining market share over the latter half of the 1990s.  
 
6. “Big Bang” Deregulation in the Samurai Market 
  The relative fees of foreign and Japanese underwriters do not imply anything 
about the competitive impact of foreign competition in yen-denominated bond markets. 
Even if foreign underwriters charge higher fees, they may provide superior services or 
serve specific segments of the market, as our counterfactual results suggested in the 
previous section, such that their presence still provides competitive pressure to domestic  23
underwriters. To answer the question of the impact of foreign entry, we examine the 1996 
“Big Bang” deregulation in the Japanese Samurai market. 
  As shown in Figure 1, prior to the fall of 1995 not a single foreign underwriter 
had participated in this market.
 8  However, the share of participation by foreign 
underwriters grew rapidly after the 1996 liberalization, culminating in 2000. After that 
year, the low interest rates associated with the quantitative easing program adopted by the 
Bank of Japan reduced the relative attractiveness of the Japanese bond market to foreign 
investment banks and their market shares declined. 
  This section examines the impact of the Samurai market liberalization on 
competitive conditions faced by foreign issuers in that market, taking 1996 as the break 
year for the liberalization. We use propensity scoring matching, with foreign issues in the 
euro-yen bond market as a control. For quality matching to take place, it must be the case 
that there are substantial overlaps in the types of firms issuing in the two samples and that 
there is sufficient data on firm characteristics that allows us to identify good matches. In 
our case, both of these should apply. We have an ample number of yen-denominated 
issues in the euro-yen market from which to choose matches, as the number of euro-yen 
issues far exceeds the number of issues in the Samurai market.  
  Figure 2 reveals that underwriting fees in the Samurai market followed an 
interesting path over the course of our sample. Underwriter fees in the Samurai market 
were notably higher than those in the euro-yen market from 1996 through 1998, and then 
fell dramatically to almost equal the euro-yen fee levels.  
                                                 
8 The two issues in the fall of 1995 were both underwritten by Merrill Lynch, which  underwrote one of its 
own issues as well as an issue by Volvo Group Finance. These 2 issues accounted for only 2.46% of 
Samurai issues that year.  24
  We therefore proceed by matching our observations from the Samurai market 
with control issues from the euro-yen market using matching methods to account for 
changes in the characteristics of issues in the two markets.
9 To examine the robustness of 
our results, we use two alternative matching mechanisms:  
First, we use the Mahalanobis matching method, which matches treatment 
observations with their counterparts in the untreated group with the closest 
characteristics. Given an observation in the treated group with characteristics ,  the 
Mahalanobis distance from an observation in the control group with characteristics  , 
, satisfies 
 ,  (4) 
where   is the sample covariance of  .  
  Our characteristic vector includes the same conditioning variables as those used in 
the second stage of our IV specification. In particular, we use JSHARE, our continuous 
indicator of the share of Japanese underwriter participation, rather than the discrete 
classification we were forced to use in the previous section for our switching regression 
analysis, as it is more informative for issues with mixed participation. We also include 
time dummies. As a robustness check, we repeat the exercise and tighten the calipers, 
effectively eliminating treated observation outliers that do not have corresponding 
matches in the untreated group with sufficiently similar characteristics.  
                                                 
9 One potential problem with our controls might arise if the Samurai and euro-yen markets differ in their 
credit rating standards. Packer and Reynolds (1997) find that Japanese agencies tend to give higher ratings 
than their US counterparts, but the magnitude of this discrepancy appears to be similar in the Samurai and 
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  Second, we also match using propensity scores. This method matches each treated 
observation with one or more untreated observations that have sufficiently close 
probabilities of being in the treated group. This is done in a two-step procedure, where 
we initially run a Probit regression to estimate each observation’s propensity score and 
then use these estimated propensity scores to match our treated observations and estimate 
the impact of the treatment. The conditioning variables used in our Probit estimation are 
the same as those above, except SAMURAI, COLLATERAL, and the time dummies 
needed to be dropped, as they predicted success or failure perfectly. Again, as a 
robustness check for the propensity scoring estimates, we match each treated observation 
both to its “nearest neighbor” in the untreated group, as well as a wider set of neighbors, 
set to the nearest 10 neighbors in our reported results below. 
  Note that we are comparing the impact of allowing foreign underwriter entry in 
the Samurai market to activity in the euro-yen market, which allowed foreign entry over 
the duration of our sample. Consequently, our matching exercise will yield an estimate of 
the impact of not allowing foreign entry in the Samurai market, rather than of allowing 
entry. However, this should still provide a consistent estimate of the impact of the 
liberalization in the Samurai market. 
  Our results are reported in Table 7. It can be seen that regardless of the matching 
method chosen, we find that there was a statistically significant average treatment on the 
treated (ATT) at standard confidence levels, although the statistical significance fell to a 
10% level using the propensity scoring method. The average effect over our four 
matching methods was equal to 23.4 basis points. Our test therefore indicates that after 
controlling for issue characteristics, the decline in fees was significantly larger for the  26
treatment group (foreign yen-denominated issuers in the Samurai market) than for the 
control group (foreign yen-denominated issuers in the euro-yen market). The results 
therefore indicate that the 1996 liberalization that allowed foreign banks to offer 
underwriting services in the Samurai bond market led to reduced fees in that market.
10 
  Because the policy intervention concerns the allowance of foreign underwriter 
participation, we cannot condition on the choice of underwriter prior to 1996. This poses 
a potential problem for our specification, as we verified above that the choice of 
underwriter nationality is endogenous to firm characteristics. We therefore provide some 
robustness analysis by examining the impact of the policy liberalization on the subset of 
firms that issued under domestic Japanese underwriters. We do this for the same set of 
conditioning variables in the lower part of Table 7. It can be seen that our results are 
robust to isolating this sub-sample, as the advent of foreign underwriters is shown to have 
resulted in a statistically significant decrease in expected fees in four out of the five 
exercises. The lone exception is the one-to-one propensity scoring specification, which 
displays a drop in expected fees, but one that is statistically insignificant. 
 
7. Conclusion 
  This paper examines the impact of foreign participation in underwriting services 
on Japanese bond markets. We first looked at the determinants and implications of the 
use of foreign underwriters in the euro-yen and Samurai bond markets. There were 
                                                 
10 We also conducted a number of robustness tests. First, we ran both Mahalonobis matching and one-to-
one propensity scoring matching with interest rate spreads included. These specifications also indicated that 
there was a substantial decrease in fees. However, the small sample size resulted in large estimated 
standard errors, as there were only 16 treated observations meeting our support criteria. Second, we 
introduced the share of foreign underwriters as an additional conditioning variable and obtained similar 
statistically significant results as those reported in the text.   27
notable differences between issues that chose domestic or foreign underwriters. Japanese 
underwriters are favored by firms that are riskier, seasoned and Japanese, and those with 
bond issues that are smaller and collateralized. Issuers that are larger, safer and non-
Japanese tend to be more likely to choose foreign underwriters in yen-denominated 
markets. Indeed, while Japanese underwriters were found to charge higher fees on 
average than their foreign counterparts, we found that after conditioning for issue 
characteristics and instrumenting for the underwriter nationality decision, Japanese 
underwriting fees were actually below those of their foreign counterparts.  
Still, our results did not necessarily imply that Japanese underwriters were 
“cheaper,” as it is possible that Japanese and foreign underwriters specialized in servicing 
different types of issuers. Our switching regression results confirmed this possibility, as 
neither firms that issued with Japanese or foreign underwriters appear to have made an 
error in their underwriter nationality choice. Instead, our counterfactual analysis predicted 
that both groups would have faced higher fees had they underwriter nationality. 
  Finally, we examine the impact of entry by foreign underwriters in the Japanese 
bond market, using the test case of the 1996 liberalization of foreign participation in the 
Japanese Samurai bond market. We conducted a Mahalonobis and propensity scoring 
matching exercise, using foreign yen-denominated issues in the euro-yen market as a 
control. Our results provided robust evidence that spreads in the euro-yen market fell 
after the liberalization. 
  Overall, then, our results indicate that there is partial segmentation of the issuer 
markets served by Japanese and foreign underwriters. On one hand, we find some 
evidence of segmentation, as both firms issuing with Japanese and foreign underwriters  28
appear to have received lower fees than they would have obtained by switching 
underwriter nationality. However, we also found that allowing entry by foreign 
underwriters in the Samurai bond market appeared to lead to a statistically significant 
reduction in underwriting fees, even for the sub-sample of firms that solely issued with 
Japanese underwriters. This finding suggests that foreign and Japanese underwriters are 
partly in competition with each other as well, so that the segmentation is incomplete. 
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  Euro-yen Market  Samurai Market 
  Year < 1996  Year ≥ 1996  Year < 1996  Year ≥ 1996 
Avg. log of total value of issue   17.65  16.71  19.17  19.10 
% investment grade  82.59  96.64  67.73  81.82 
Avg. years to maturity  6.76  10.15  6.55  5.38 
% issuer first time  14.96  4.27  30.91  8.31 
Avg. share of top underwriters  0.74  0.74  0.81  0.90 
Avg. overall share of top 
underwriters  0.75 0.87 0.83 0.93 
% collateralized  0.68  4.63  0.45  0 
Avg. fee  0.53  0.35  0.82  0.95 
Avg. yield  3.37  2.43  5.09  3.93 
Avg. Japanese underwriter share 
(%)  0.82 0.72 0.99 0.78 
# of issues  2,045  5,809  220  385 
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# of issues  4412  1782  -- 
 
Note: This table summarizes our database of issuance in the yen-denominated Samurai 
and euroyen bond markets, but excludes data on issuance in the Japanese domestic bond 
market.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  * denotes significance at the 10% 













Determinants of Underwriter Nationality  
 
Dependent variable: Share of Japanese underwriters 
Estimation technique:  OLS regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CONSTANT  1.54*** 1.44*** 1.22*** 1.14*** 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
JAPANISSUER  0.060*** 0.056***  0.14***  0.14*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) 
YIELD     0.035***  0.035*** 
     (0.0078)  (0.0078) 
INVGRADE  -0.061*** -0.064***  -0.061**  -0.064*** 
  (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) 
LTOTVAL  -0.066*** -0.064*** -0.054*** -0.053*** 
  (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0061) (0.0061) 
LYRSMAT  0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 
  (0.0086) (0.0086)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
COLLATERAL  0.035 0.031  0.080*  0.074* 
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.044) (0.043) 
UNDREP  0.30*** 0.083* 0.27***  0.070 
  (0.027) (0.048) (0.028) (0.053) 
OVERUNDREP   0.29***  0.26*** 
   (0.054)  (0.060) 
UNSEASONED  -0.013 -0.023 0.011 0.0042 
  (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) 
SAMURAI  0.22*** 0.21*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) 
No.  Obs.  3069 3069 2462 2462 
R
2  0.29 0.30 0.31 0.32 
Note: Ordinary least squares regression of determinant of share of Japanese underwriters, 
with robust standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies have been estimated, but are 
not reported.  
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** 
denotes significance at the 5% level; and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4 
Determinants of Underwriting Fees 
 
Dependent variable: Underwriter fees/total values of issue (%) 
Estimation technique: IV regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CONSTANT  6.12*** 6.05***  0.72  0.68 
  (1.80) (1.87) (0.49) (0.48) 
JSHARE  -3.93*** -4.17***  -0.75**  -0.76** 
  (1.05) (1.17) (0.30) (0.30) 
YIELD     0.14***  0.14*** 
     (0.019)  (0.019) 
INVGRADE  -0.18 -0.20 0.032 0.029 
  (0.13) (0.14)  (0.044)  (0.045) 
LTOTVAL  -0.23*** -0.24***  -0.016  -0.016 
  (0.076) (0.082) (0.019) (0.019) 
LYRSMAT  0.39*** 0.41***  -0.055  -0.055 
  (0.11) (0.12)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
COLLATERAL  0.083 0.073  0.0086  0.0055 
  (0.16) (0.17)  (0.067)  (0.066) 
UNDREP  1.28*** 0.41* 0.29***  0.16*** 
  (0.34) (0.22)  (0.087)  (0.053) 
OVERUNDREP   1.26***   0.18* 
   (0.41)  (0.10) 
UNSEASONED  -0.11 -0.16  -0.0028  -0.0075 
  (0.14) (0.15)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
SAMURAI  1.27*** 1.29*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 
  (0.22) (0.23)  (0.082)  (0.081) 
No.  Obs.  3069 3069 2462 2462 
R
2  . .  0.084  0.076 
Note: IV estimation of underwriter fees, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Year 
dummies have been estimated, but are not reported.  
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** 
denotes significance at the 5% level; and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 5 
Endogenous Switching Regression Results  
for Fees on Euroyen and Samurai Bonds after 1995 
 








CONSTANT  3.72*** -0.74***  0.049 
  (0.51) (0.13) (0.25) 
JAPANISSUER  0.55***    
  (0.088)    
YIELD  0.18*** 0.092***  0.22*** 
  (0.021) (0.0043)  (0.0089) 
INVGRADE  -0.30** 0.17*** 0.030 
  (0.15) (0.031)  (0.062) 
LTOTVAL  -0.27*** 0.056*** -0.0062 
  (0.026) (0.0074)  (0.014) 
LYRSMAT  0.46*** -0.16***  -0.10*** 
  (0.045) (0.012) (0.020) 
COLLATERAL  0.28* -0.093**  -0.10* 
  (0.17) (0.045)  (0.059) 
UNDREP  0.87*** 0.044  0.076** 
  (0.096) (0.034) (0.034) 
UNSEASONED  0.095 0.0049  0.0034 
  (0.14) (0.038)  (0.044) 
SAMURAI  0.61*** 0.35*** 0.050 
  (0.12) (0.029)  (0.042) 
N   2462 
r2    
 
Note:  Endogenous switching regression of underwriting fees in the euroyean and 
Samuarii bond markets.  Year dummies have been estimated, but are not reported.  
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** 
denotes significance at the 5% level; and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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 Table 6 




   Fees   








All Foreign  50.935  63.632  12.696*** 
 Japanese  38.089  56.575  18.485*** 
Japanese Foreign  29.214  39.942  10.727*** 
 Japanese  18.992  40.504  21.512*** 
Foreign Foreign  62.918  76.700  13.782*** 
 Japanese  42.014  59.877  17.863*** 
Seasoned Foreign  50.362  63.590  13.228*** 
 Japanese  38.884  57.011  18.127*** 
Unseasoned Foreign  63.138  64.526  1.388 




Foreign 47.827  61.117  13.290*** 




Foreign 51.140  63.797  12.657*** 
 Japanese  38.948  57.308  18.360*** 
 
Note: Counterfactual analysis of underwriting fees in the Samurai and euroyen bond 
markets based on endogenous switching regression techniques.   
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and *** 


















Impact of liberalization in Samurai market 
 
  Dependent Variable: Underwriting fees 















Treated 0.82  0.82  0.86  0.82 0.82 
Controls 0.52  0.50  0.48  0.72  0.75 
Difference 0.30***  0.32***  0.38***  0.10*  0.07* 
S.E. 0.03  0.09  0.10  0.06  0.04 
T-stat 8.77  3.65 3.81  1.79  1.68 
Untreated 2190  2190  2190  2190  2190 
Treated 211  211  188  211 211 
 
Note: Difference-in-differences matching exercise.   
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; and *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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